Naval Ambitions vs National Ails: Pakistan’s Self‑Defeating Maritime Paradox

A paradox presents two opposing ideas or aspects of a situation that seem to contradict each other. - Cambridge dictionary.

When one reads the meaning of the term paradox and tries to relate it with any one country, the immediate name that comes to mind is one and only Pakistan. Why is it so? Well the answer lies in the following explanation.

Pakistan on Tuesday (June 10) announced its federal budget for fiscal year 2025-26 with a total outlay of Pakistan rupees (PKR) 7.57 trillion ($62 billion), an overall decrease in spending by 7%, but hiked the defence expenditure by 20% following a recent military conflict with India during Operation Sindoor.

Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb presented a budget that allocated PKR 2.55 trillion ($9 billion) for defence spending in FY26, compared to PKR 2.12 trillion in the fiscal year ending this month.

So, what is paradoxical about this development? This significant increase, the highest in recent years, comes at a time when the country is grappling with its highest-ever public debt, raising concerns about the utilisation of international aid. Pakistan's poverty situation has gone from bad to worse. The World Bank in its latest report classified 16.5% of Pakistanis living in extreme poverty.

The World Bank's latest projections indicate that Pakistan's poverty rate remains as high as 42.4 per cent. An estimated number of 1.9 million additional people fell into poverty in 2024-25. Pakistan's inflation rate is pegged at a staggering 24.8%.

But instead of alleviating the lives of its people, the Pakistan government is busy turning its country into a security state by arming its military to the teeth to show aggression towards India. Islamabad is vigorously pursuing an ambitious naval expansion. With a goal to grow its fleet to 50 ships, including cutting-edge submarines and frigates, the Pakistan Navy's expansion stands in stark contrast to the nation's deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

Pakistan's narratives around its naval expansion, particularly when viewed in the context of the country's economic and political realities, are widely considered overly ambitious and unrealistic. The Pakistan Navy has stated goals of modernisation and increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), but in reality it is nowhere near its so-called expansion plans.

Pakistan's naval modernisation efforts heavily rely on foreign technology, particularly from China. This dependence raises questions about the long-term sustainability of Pakistan's naval ambitions and its ability to maintain and upgrade these advanced platforms. The reliance on foreign assistance also limits Pakistan's ability to independently project naval power.

Pakistan's naval infrastructure is underfunded and underdeveloped, with concerns about the operational readiness of the fleet. The country has been using manipulated images to falsely claim fleet deployments, raising further doubts about the reliability of its narratives.

Moreover, the Pakistan Navy, the smallest of its three services, has been constrained by limited funds. Being larger than the Navy and Air Force put together, the Pakistan Army receives the maximum share of defence expenditure, followed by the Air Force and the lowest allocation has been for the navy.

Since 2019, the Pakistani Army has been getting 47.5%, Air Force 21.3%, Navy 10.8% and inter-services organisations 20.3% of the allocation. A decline in naval investment could impact Pakistan's ability to project power, deter threats, and protect its maritime interests.

After all, fighting does not depend only on the military; it needs a solid economic base. One cannot fight with imported military hardware, as its availability is not guaranteed. Such supplies can dry out anytime if the understanding between the countries gets disturbed on any political or economic issue.

Besides, it requires a huge financial outflow, which Pakistan cannot sustain. Moreover, due to the very limited naval capacity of the Pakistan Navy, it will not be able to keep the logistic line open, which has been amply amplified in 1971 and subsequent operations.

At the same time, Pakistan, in its present financial and political condition, will not, for a considerable time in future, be able to form its indigenous base. Its import system by land, water, and air can easily be blocked.

There is the problem of unreliable allies as well.

No alliance in the world is permanent. All of these are politically based. Each partner is basically trying to get its own pound of flesh. It can be commented with conviction that China, presently Islamabad's closest international ally, is very unlikely to confront India directly for the sake of Pakistan. It may play brinkmanship but is unlikely to get physically involved, defence analysts have said.

This isn't just conjecture. There is evidence of such behaviour from Beijing's side.

In 1971, the Headquarters of General Yahyah Khan, President of Pakistan, repeatedly assured Lt Gen A A K Niazi, commander of the East Pakistan Army, that China would mobilise its army any time, but it never came. Its support was primarily diplomatic.

China may never like to physically get involved against India and lose a market in India, a country of 140 crore population, that too for Pakistan, a dying state. There is no match.

It is also well-known that Pakistan armed forces have a history of using "obsolete" Chinese and North Korean defence equipment and technology, which makes it much inferior to India.

Most of the Equipment developed by these two countries is low-cost or cheap and hence a crude technology. Most equipment is also heavy and hence less portable and difficult to manoeuvre.

They lack originality and try to make a copy of western technology. Moreover, they use equipment supplied to Pakistan as a test bed, sometimes even obsolete in their own country.