Chinese Military Expands Fleet of Underwater 'Predator' Unmanned Subs

A newly observed Chinese submarine at Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard has renewed scrutiny of Beijing’s undersea military build-up, at a time when the People’s Liberation Army Navy is already expanding faster than any other major submarine force. The vessel, seen in satellite imagery at a fitting-out basin on May 31, appears unusual because it lacks the prominent sail traditionally associated with submarines, according to a report in ANI.

The design has not been officially acknowledged by China, and its role remains unconfirmed. But its appearance has drawn attention because Jiangnan has not been known as China’s main nuclear-submarine construction site. That work has traditionally been linked to Huludao Shipyard in Liaoning, where another new submarine has also been monitored by defence analysts this year.

Why China’s new submarine design is drawing attention

The vessel spotted in Shanghai is estimated by submarine analyst H I Sutton to be about 120 metres long and roughly 10-11 metres wide. Its most striking features are a smooth bow, X-form rudders and a very small or near-absent sail. Such a configuration can reduce drag and may help underwater performance, although the exact design purpose is not publicly known.

Analysts believe the boat is clearly a new class, but not a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. That distinction matters because ballistic missile submarines are central to nuclear deterrence, while attack submarines and guided-missile submarines are used for sea denial, intelligence gathering, escort missions and strikes against land or naval targets.

The uncertainty is now focused on whether the Shanghai vessel or the separate boat observed at Huludao is connected to China’s long-anticipated Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine programme. The Huludao submarine is reported to be slightly shorter but wider than the Shanghai design, leaving open the possibility that China is testing parallel designs or different mission variants.

Propulsion remains one of the biggest questions. A submarine of this size would normally suggest nuclear power. If it were conventionally powered, it would be exceptionally large by global standards. China has also experimented with a low-power nuclear reactor linked to air-independent propulsion, but analysts have treated that option as less likely for the new Shanghai boat.

PLAN submarine fleet is expanding at pace

The larger concern for rival navies is not one experimental-looking vessel, but the speed at which China is adding undersea capability. Estimates cited in recent US testimony suggest the PLAN already operates more than 60 submarines and could reach around 70 by 2027. By 2035, the fleet could rise to about 80 boats, with roughly half nuclear-powered.

That would mark a major shift in force composition. Nuclear-powered submarines can remain submerged for far longer than diesel-electric boats, travel at higher sustained speeds and operate across greater distances. For China, that supports ambitions beyond coastal defence and into sustained operations in the western Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific.

US naval officials have warned that China’s next generation of nuclear attack submarines is expected to be quieter, better armed and more capable than earlier Chinese designs. The Type 095, in particular, is expected to improve stealth, propulsion and strike capacity, including the ability to launch long-range land-attack cruise missiles from underwater.

Even if the first Type 095 does not formally enter service for several years, the production trend is already reshaping military planning. China is believed to have launched between 15 and 20 submarines across multiple classes in the past five years. Its shipyards have also undergone major expansion, increasing construction hall capacity and enabling work on larger, more advanced submarines.

Why nuclear submarines matter in the Indo-Pacific

China’s submarine expansion is closely tied to its broader maritime strategy. Beijing sees the seas around China as central to national security, trade routes, deterrence and military competition with the United States and its allies. Submarines are especially valuable because they are difficult to detect and can complicate an adversary’s operations during a crisis.

For China’s ballistic missile submarines, one key question is whether they will patrol close to home in protected “bastion” areas or venture into the open Pacific. Bastion operations in areas such as the Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea or northern South China Sea would be easier to defend. Open-ocean patrols would be riskier but could make submarines harder to track once they pass the First Island Chain.

The First Island Chain, stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines towards Indonesia, remains a major geographic constraint for Chinese submarines seeking access to the Pacific. These chokepoints are watched closely by the US and allied forces. Any improvement in Chinese submarine quieting, endurance and weapons range would therefore have direct consequences for regional security.

The build-up is also influencing other countries. Australia has chosen nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership with the United States and United Kingdom, beginning with planned access to Virginia-class boats before the future SSN-AUKUS class. South Korea has also launched plans to develop nuclear-powered submarines, citing endurance, mobility and regional deterrence needs.

China has not released details about the newly observed Shanghai submarine, and its final classification may not be clear for some time. What is already evident is that Beijing’s undersea programme is becoming larger, more varied and more ambitious. For Indo-Pacific navies, each new hull adds another layer to an already demanding contest beneath the surface.

With inputs from ANI