Theatre Commands are India’s Strategic Necessity, Not a Choice!

The debate on theatre commands has once again come to the fore, with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) emphasising it as the "next orbit" of jointness, while voices of caution, particularly from the Air Force, question whether India should pursue such reforms at all. This is not a contest of institutional pride. It is a debate about India's ability to deter, fight, and win wars in the 21st century. On that question, the conclusion is clear: theatreisation is not a matter of choice. It is a necessity, and delay only plays into the hands of our adversaries.

Why Integration Cannot Wait

India today faces its most complex security environment since Independence. The threat is no longer confined to one border or one domain. The collusion between China and Pakistan has created a real possibility of coordinated pressure on both the northern and western fronts. Beijing's 2015-16 reforms, which dismantled seven military regions and created five joint theatre commands, were not cosmetic. The Western Theatre Command (WTC) now integrates ground, air, and rocket forces for precisely the terrain we share across the Himalayas.

By contrast, India continues with 17 single-service commands: seven for the Army, seven for the Air Force, and three for the Navy-designed in an era when wars were linear and domains were separate. Today, cyber and space attacks can cripple networks before a shot is fired. Electronic warfare can blind radars and jam communications. Drones can saturate air defences in hours. Fighting in silos is simply untenable.

The Kargil Review Committee (1999) made this point forcefully, recommending the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff and integrated commands after coordination failures delayed the use of air power. The Group of Ministers (2001) endorsed the need for structural reforms. The Naresh Chandra Task Force (2011) called for a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as a step towards theatreisation. The Shekatkar Committee (2016) went further, suggesting three integrated theatre commands-Northern, Western, and Southern-as a practical way to improve synergy.

That we are still debating these recommendations nearly a quarter-century after Kargil reflects inertia, not wisdom.

The Air Power Objections - and Why They Fall Short

The Air Force has been the most vocal in expressing reservations. These deserve a fair hearing but do not withstand scrutiny.

Scarcity of assets

With just 29 fighter squadrons, the IAF argues it cannot afford to "split" its strength among multiple theatre commanders. However, theatreisation does not permanently divide resources. It ensures that scarce assets are pooled nationally and allocated dynamically where the battle demands. Scarcity strengthens, not weakens, the case for integration: when resources are limited, duplication and siloed planning are luxuries we cannot afford.

"Sword broken into three pieces"

The metaphor suggests that dividing the IAF will blunt its edge. But a sword can strike only one point at a time. Air power under theatreisation can be massed, dispersed, or shifted between theatres as the situation dictates. The U.S. and China both employ theatre models and still conduct decisive air campaigns. Integration has not dulled their forces; it has sharpened them.

Air power as decisive by itself

Air power is indispensable, but it cannot win wars alone. Kargil (1999) is a case in point: despite vital IAF strikes, the war ended only when Indian infantry physically recaptured the heights. Ukraine continues to resist today not solely because of its air or missile power, but because of its resilient ground forces holding terrain against a larger adversary. Even Israel, with overwhelming air superiority, has had to commit troops on the ground in Gaza and Lebanon to achieve objectives. Air power shapes battlefields; land forces decide them.

The Operation Sindoor example

Operation Sindoor has been cited as proof of centralised air power's success. It was indeed a masterclass in rapid, calibrated strikes that compelled a ceasefire in days. But Op Sindoor was a limited punitive campaign where centralised planning from Delhi was feasible. A prolonged two-front conflict-China on the LAC and Pakistan in the west-will not afford such luxuries. Theatre commanders must have the authority to synchronise land, sea, and air operations in real time. Without this, delays, duplication, and even fratricide risks multiply.

The Primacy of Land and Maritime Power

At its core, war is about controlling territory and people. That responsibility falls to land forces. Maritime power, meanwhile, secures India's economic lifelines through the Indian Ocean and projects influence into the wider Indo-Pacific. Air power is indispensable, but its greatest value lies in enabling and amplifying the success of surface campaigns.

Doctrine is clear: control of the tactical battlespace entails control of the airspace above it. Ground and maritime commanders cannot depend on distant approvals for drones, close air support, or air defence coordination. Authority must reside at the theatre level to ensure responsiveness, prevent friendly fire, and achieve unity of effort.

This is not about diminishing the Air Force. It is about recognising that the purpose of all arms is to secure the theatre commander's objectives, not to preserve service silos.

Reform Is About Efficiency and Credibility

Theatreisation is also an economic imperative. India's defence budget for FY 2025-26 is ₹6.81 lakh crore, of which only ₹1.80 lakh crore is earmarked for capital modernisation. With resources under strain, duplication across 17 commands, in logistics, training, and maintenance, is wasteful. Rationalisation will free funds for modernisation in drones, AI-enabled systems, hypersonic weapons, and cyber defence.

The Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control, and Discipline) Act, 2023, already provides the legal foundation for joint structures. Theatre commanders will have administrative and disciplinary authority across services. This ends the argument that legal frameworks are absent; what is lacking is the will to move from concept to execution.

The proposed structure, three integrated theatre commands: Northern (China), Western (Pakistan), and Maritime/Peninsular (Indian Ocean), is both logical and achievable. Service chiefs will continue to "raise, train, and sustain." Theatre commanders will be responsible for the application of force. This division of labour strengthens all services and streamlines decision-making for the political leadership.

A Fine Balance

India has been debating theatreisation for more than two decades. China implemented its reforms over a two-year period. Every year of hesitation erodes deterrence and emboldens adversaries. Implementation can be phased, but must be bound by clear timelines. Delay is not caution; it is drift.

The government has already declared 2025 the "Year of Reforms." If that declaration is to mean anything, theatreisation must be at the centre. It is not a cosmetic reshuffle. It is a foundational restructuring to ensure that India's armed forces can fight jointly, decisively, and efficiently in the wars of the future.

Final Thoughts

This debate is not about service egos. It is about national survival in an unforgiving strategic environment. To deny theatreisation is to cling to outdated silos that adversaries will exploit. To embrace it is to project strength, cohesion, and preparedness.

Wars are won by joint, integrated forces, with land power at the core, enabled by sea and air. India cannot afford endless debate when threats are immediate. The time to act is now.

Col Danvir Singh (Retd) is a decorated infantry officer, strategic affairs analyst, and host of a leading television show on India's military and security issues.