Supreme Court on credibility of extra-judicial confessions in criminal cases

The Supreme Court’s observation came in an appeal challenging the conviction of one Nikhil Chandra Mondal in a murder case by the Calcutta High Court.

The Supreme Court of India has recently observed that the credibility of an extra-judicial confession decreases when the circumstances surrounding it are doubtful.

Court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon an extra-judicial confession, a Bench comprising Justice B R Gavai and Sanjay Karol said.

"It is a settled principle of law that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. It has been held that where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance. It has further been held that it is well-settled that it is a rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial confession. It has been held that there is no doubt that conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence," the Bench said.

The Supreme Court's observation came in an appeal challenging the conviction of one Nikhil Chandra Mondal in a murder case by the Calcutta High Court. The High Court had reversed the judgment of the trial court which had acquitted Mondal.

Appearing for the appellant, advocate Rukhsana Choudhary argued that the the High Court had grossly erred in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial court which had acquitted her client.

Appearing for the state, advocate Astha Sharma submitted that the High Court had rightly found that extra-judicial confession made before the prosecution witness is trustworthy, reliable and cogent.

The law with regard to conviction in the case of circumstance evidence was well laid out I the Sharad Birdichand vs State of Maharashtra.

The court was of the view that the circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude any possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human possibility the act must have been done by the accused.

"It can thus be seen that this Court has held that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It has been held that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved". It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty," the Bench noted.

The Supreme Court noted that the trial court had disbelieved the recovery of the clothes and weapon on two grounds-first that there was no memorandum statement of the accused as required under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872 and secondly, the recovery of the knife was from an open place accessible to one and all.

"We find that the approach adopted by the trial court was in accordance with law. However, this circumstance which, in our view, could not have been used, has been employed by the High Court to seek corroboration to the extra-judicial confession", the Supreme Court Bench noted.

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and noted that it had grossly erred in interfering with the trial court's well-reasoned order of acquittal.