Why does General Musharraf hold special interest for Indians, though largely for opaque reasons

Added to this, was his cavalier response during his breakfast meeting with Indian journalists, where he pooh-poohed talks of cross-border terrorism

Musharraf is the only head of the state to have had five summit meetings with Indian prime ministers, 2 with AB Vajpayee of BJP and 3 with Manmohan Singh of Congress. A quintessential chameleon, he could deftly display different colours to different people, enticing them to deal with him. To Shashi Tharoor, he was 'a real force for peace, smart, engaging and clear in strategic thinking.' To Mehbooba Mufti, he was a crusader for peace, while a former R&AW chief, a veteran on Kashmir affairs, thought India had no better leader from Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue. If others did not join the chorus, it was because they were afraid of being branded as anti-national in the eco-system that BJP has generated.

Let's go over General's track record on peace during his eight-year rule. Just before seizing power, he orchestrated (July,1999) occupation of Indian Army outposts on the highlands of Kargil in Ladakh, using troops and infiltrators. These were wrested back after 60 days of a bloody conflict in which 527 Indian soldiers died and 1300 were injured. Four months later, his terror surrogates hijacked IC 814 and took it to Kandahar in exchange for release of 4 dreaded Pak-based terrorists. On October 1, 2001, J&K legislative assembly was bombed and six weeks later, Indian Parliament was attacked by LeT and JuM terrorists, operating from Pakistan. On July 11, 2006, a series of bomb blasts shook Mumbai's suburban Railway, killing 209 people and injuring 700 others. Altogether, 22,472 terrorist incidents took places in J&K, killing thousands of soldiers and civilians. Within two months of his exit as President, 173 persons were killed and 308 injured in Mumbai terror attacks. It was an inevitable offshoot of his policy of nurturing and providing logistics and moral justification for violence in J&K and the rest of India.

Yet, Vajpayee and his advisers fell for his noises for improving ties with India. They forgot the scar of Kargil war and invited him. He was given a Presidential welcome and ironically, escorted to Mahatma Gandhi's memorial, an apostle of peace. They even looked sideways as he met Kashmiri separatist leaders before going to Agra for talks (July 14-16, 2001) with Vajpayee. Both sides discussed measures to reduce nuclear risks, cross-border terrorism, enhance connectivity, release POWs, withdraw troops in phases and improve commercial ties. So far so good. But when he opened his fangs and asked for free trade and movement across LOC, self-governance in Kashmir without independence and its joint supervision by India, Pakistan and Kashmiris without committing to end cross-border terrorism, Indian interlocutors were alarmed. Added to this, was his cavalier response during his breakfast meeting with Indian journalists, where he pooh-poohed talks of cross-border terrorism, his role in Kargil, presence of terrorists in Pakistan and ISI's subversive activities in India. It was clear he would not stop supporting Kashmiri militancy and use free movement and trade across LOC to push militants, weapons, drugs, counterfeit currencies under joint supervision for future escalation in violence. Vajpayee was finally prevailed to reject General's proposals outright. His bluff called, Musharraf returned home empty-handed, blaming L K Advani unfairly.

However, under pressure from the US and domestic opposition, General continued to seek peace with India as a diversionary relief. In 2003, he enforced ceasefire and in 2004, he invited Vajpayee for bilateral talks in Islamabad where he agreed not to allow terrorists to operate against India. It did not prevent terror attacks but it did result in a drop in infiltration and violence in the valley which PM Modi achieved without a summit and by letting forces hit back with punitive interest.

The comparative lull was enough for peaceniks to feel excited and restart diplomatic and Track-II contacts. As a result, General met PM Singh in Sept 2004, April 2005 and October 2006 to find a resolution of Kashmir, though on his terms. It couldn't happen mainly due to fear of political backlash. He also impressed on Singh that his forces would not occupy Siachen glaciers and Saltoro Ridge should these were vacated, subsequent to the demilitarisation of agreed areas by both sides. Singh had almost conceded, given a prevalent view among several security experts and politicians that Siachen was of no strategic importance, reminding one of what Nehru thought of Aksai Chin - a worthless desert. General finally chickened out when Army laid conditions before withdrawing. Dealing with General further became difficult when terrorists bombed 200 travellers to death on July 11, 2006 in Mumbai local trains.

(Amar Bhushan worked with the Research and Analysis Wing for 24 years after briefly serving in the BSF intelligence, State Special Branch and Intelligence Bureau. He served as the Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat before he retired in 2005.)

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