IAEA losing ground in anti-atom bomb fight--study

VIENNA, Aug 26 (Reuters) Underfunded and under-equipped, the UN atomic watchdog is losing ground in its mission to uncover abuses of nuclear know-how for bombmaking, a two-year study by a US think-tank has found.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to nip bomb threats in the bud suffered a big defeat in North Korea and have been complicated in Iran by that nation's lack of transparency, although Tehran pledged last week to resolve inquiries.

And the IAEA's task looks to get more formidable in coming years as nine of 15 states seeking to join the current nuclear energy club of 31 are in the volatile Middle East, hedging their security bets for fear Iran is on course to a bomb.

''The IAEA is falling behind in achieving its (nuclear) material accountancy mission,'' concluded a report by the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) in Washington.

''It risks slipping further unless members of the (35-nation) IAEA board take remedial actions in the next 2-5 years.'' Serious flaws had cropped up in the IAEA's methods of monitoring and verification meant to certify that no nuclear materials or activities are being diverted to weaponisation banned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPEC said.

Amounts of potentially bomb-grade nuclear material -- highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from it -- that goes unaccounted for is increasing much faster than funds at hand for safeguarding it, the study found.

''The IAEA is unable to provide timely warning of diversions from nuclear fuel-making plants,'' it said.

Further, the IAEA's original estimates for how much nuclear material is needed to make one bomb, and how long it takes to convert HEU or plutonium into explosive, were set in the 1970s and were anywhere from 25-800 per cent too high.

SHORT OF MONEY TO DO THE JOB Chronic cash crunches had handicapped the IAEA with insufficient equipment and antiquated laboratories that test environmental samples taken from sites of concern.

''Only about a third of the nuclear facilities where the IAEA has remote sensors have near real-time connectivity with Vienna (IAEA headquarters), and almost all these facilities are in countries of minimal proliferation risk,'' the report said.

''Most of the ... sensors do not allow the IAEA to know day to day if these systems are on...Over the past six years the agency learned of camera 'blackouts' that lasted for more than 30 hours on 12 occasions.'' The study also noted, reflecting a complaint by IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei to a board meeting in July, that the agency's safeguards division was so underfunded it had to rely on additional voluntary contributions.

One financing remedy could be a user fee paid for by each safeguarded nuclear operator, the report said.

IAEA officials declined comment on the NPEC study.

But in July, ElBaradei warned the IAEA board that the agency's safeguards system ''is being eroded over time'' due to thin financing and overtaxed and sometimes obsolete equipment.

The board approved a budget rise of 1.4 per cent above inflation in 2008. But ElBaradei called this ''far from adequate'' when nuclear proliferation challenges like Iran were mounting.

Major contributors -- industrialised nations -- have cited their own budget constraints or argued the IAEA could do its work more efficiently with resources it has.

REUTERS KK PM1505