Do RAW, others get a raw deal in the name of 'intelligence failure'?

The best of intelligence agencies in the world have faltered in preventing major terrorist attacks and assassinations, and blaming them for such failures only indicate our lack of knowledge

It is a common to blame central agencies and state special branches for their 'failure' to alert police in advance about impending terrorist attacks, communal riots and breakdown in law and order situations.

Whether it is the blockade of Shaheen Bagh, ransacking of national flag at the Red Fort, mayhem in Bihar, West Bengal, UP and Telangana over Agnipath, clashes in Karnataka over hijab or riots in UP, Maharashtra and Rajasthan over Nupur Sharma's controversial post, state intelligence is the usual target of criticism. IB and RAW are also not spared when incidents like terrorist attacks at Parliament, Taj hotel in Mumbai, air force base at Pathankot and a military base at Uri take place.

Actually, this phenomenon of pointing fingers towards the agencies shows a complete lack of understanding of ground realities.

State Intelligence officers are required to collect information about political and criminal activities. All chief ministers like to know the prospect of their party in winning elections and what dissident ministers, party functionaries, opposition party leaders, journalists, social activists, businessmen and those running down their leadership and policies are up to. This aspect of their job is carried out reasonably well with the help of electronic surveillance and contacts. But even in these cases, slip-ups do occur. Recall how upset Sharad Pawar was, with his home minister for not having a whiff of Eknath Shinde's escape to Surat and so was Kamal Nath when Scindia's men bolted away. Using electronic surveillance for this purpose is, of course, illegal, but illegality is routinely carried out without any fear or qualms.

It is inputs about criminals and terrorists' conspiracies that are extremely hard to come by because membership in their inner cell is limited to highly indoctrinated volunteers and scrutiny of anyone trying to seek information about them is rigorous.

Hence, it is seldom that one gets a chance to peep into their mind and their dark world. What we subsequently know about their plans, network and system of communication are only through coercive interrogation and analysis of seized dissemination tools. That is why the best of intelligence agencies in the world have repeatedly faltered in preventing major terrorist attacks and assassination of their leaders. The bulk of intelligence that agencies collect do not constitute more than five percent 'actionable actionable' that every law enforcement unit demands. But they do provide pointers that are like straws in the wind which trained analysts pick up and weave them into a pattern to know what is about to come. The central agencies have done a good job on this count and prevented a large number of possible terrorist attacks in the past eight years.

But police officers in states are not so fortunate. They neither have adequate human and financial resources, nor stomach for intelligence jobs. No policemen like to join the intelligence wing or special branch for it offers neither power nor illegal money of the uniform. Only the disgruntled and rejected lot are forced to wear civilian dress and work incognito. Their numbers in the field are also very few and what they are paid to lure an individual to work as a source is pittance. Some states do give them special allowances but that is peanuts as compared to what their colleagues in uniform earn over and above the salary. Officers so drafted obviously work disinterestedly and mark time until they get posted to mainstream policing. Meanwhile, they depend mainly on uniformed officers in districts and talukas who are far better placed in terms of numbers and who can use their position to obtain information in lieu of protecting the interests of their targets.

Yet, state special branches are quite useful. They may not provide actionable intelligence but their information during riots, widespread violence and law and order situations are of immense value. Their advantage is, they can merge easily with mobs to read their pulse and operate from behind the scene unlike uniformed officers who confront them with force. Their interception network also provides inputs on a continuous basis that help police to keep an eye and take preventive action against criminals and mischief makers. So next time, take a pause and reflect before talking about intelligence failure.

(Amar Bhushan worked with the Research and Analysis Wing for 24 years after briefly serving in the BSF intelligence, State Special Branch and Intelligence Bureau. He served as the Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat before he retired in 2005.)

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