123 accord assures nuclear fuel supply to India

New Delhi, Aug 3: The United States has given its firm commitment to New Delhi for reliable supply of nuclear fuel to India under the 123 agreement with an undertaking for creating the necessary conditions for assured and full access to fuel for its reactors.

Under the agreement, the text of which was released today, the US would also support India in developing a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply in the lifetime of India's reactors.

The agreement, which would remain in force for 40 years, and continue thereafter for an additional period of ten years each, was silent on the issue of nuclear testing by India.

It, however, said that either Party would have the right to terminate the agreement prior to its expiry, on one year's notice to the other side.

The text said the US would join India in seeking to negotiate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an India-specific fuel supply agreement and would support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption.

If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel occurred, the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries including Russia, UK and France, to pursue measures to restore fuel supplies to India.

It said an India-specific 'safeguards agreement' would be negotiated between India and the IAEA, providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.

Taking this into account, India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Obliquely referring to nuclear testing, Article 9 of the Agreement said that the nuclear material, equipment and components transferred and nuclear material and by-product material etc ''shall not be used by the recipient Party for any explosive nuclear device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose''.

Re-affirming that the purpose of the Agreement was to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either country, it said that nothing should be interpreted as affecting the rights of the two countries to use for their own purposes nuclear or non-nuclear material, equipment, components etc. that is transferred.

The Agreement would be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or interfere with any other activity involving the use of nuclear or non-nuclear material and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this agreement for their own purposes.

Either country will have the right to terminate the Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other country. The Agreement would terminate one year from the date of the written notice.

The country seeking termination would cease further cooperation if it determine that a mutually-acceptable solution of outstanding issues had not been possible or could not be achieved through consultations.

If a country seeking termination, cited violation of IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason, a crucial factor would be whether the IAEA Board of Governors had found non-compliance.

Following the termination, either Party would have the right to require the return of any nuclear or non-nuclear material or component through consultations. However, efforts would have to be made to resolve any dispute through negotiations. The Agreement enables full civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries in several areas including advanced nuclear energy research and development, nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, facilitation of exchange of scientists, development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption, advanced research and development in nuclear sciences, controlled thermo-nuclear fusion including in multi-lateral projects and other areas of mutual interest.

It does not require transfer of any information regarding matters outside its scope or information that the two countries are not permitted under their respective laws, treaties or regulations to transfer.

It says that sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under the Agreement pursuant to an amendment in it.

Under the Agreement, India would establish a new national re-processing facility dedicated to re-processing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the two countries will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such re-processing will take place in this new facility.

It prohibits transfer or re-transfer to unauthorised persons, beyond the recipient Party's territorial jurisdiction, of nuclear or non-nuclear material, equipment, components or information.

It, however, said the Parties will keep each other informed on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

UNI