Group urges Cong to ratify Indo-US nuke deal

Washington, June 8: An influential foreign policy group has urged the US Congress to ratify the civilian nuclear pact with India, but delay final approval until New Delhi's non-proliferation efforts are confirmed.

The Council on Foreign Relations says this approach would allow both -- preventing relations with India from being damaged and encouraging changes to its nuclear policy.

Under the pact India has agreed to open 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors for international inspection if it is allowed to buy nuclear technology and fuel from the Nuclear Suppliers' Club, which regulates global trade in nuclear technology and equipment.

But the deal would require Congress to exempt India from US laws that ban nuclear trade with that country because it has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

US officials say the treaty is not a perfect plan, saying countries like Iran have signed it, while a responsible nuclear power like India has not. ''If Congress does not approve the US-India nuclear deal, it would damage the bilateral relationship,'' concludes a new Council Special Report.

''Congress should adopt a two-stage approach: formally endorsing the deal's basic framework, while delaying final approval until it is assured that critical non-proliferation needs are met. Patience and a few simple fixes would address major proliferation concerns while ultimately strengthening the strategic partnership,'' the report 'US-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward' says.

''The Bush administration has stirred deep passions and put Congress in the seemingly impossible bind of choosing between approving the deal and damaging nuclear non-proliferation, or rejecting the deal and thereby setting back an important strategic relationship,'' say the authors, Michael A Levi and Charles D Ferguson, both Council fellows for science and technology.

But this is a false choice, they argue.

According to them, ''Congress should reserve the bulk of its political capital for a handful of top-tier objectives. It should focus on preventing Indian nuclear testing and fundamental changes in Indian nuclear strategy, rather than on blocking growth in the number of Indian nuclear weapons. It should focus on obtaining cooperation from India as well as other countries in controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, instead of on measures that would shape the development of nuclear technology in India itself.'' Congress should issue a set of bottom-line requirements for the formal US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, for India's inspection agreement with the IAEA, and for new Nuclear Suppliers Group rules that would allow nuclear commerce with India, and enforce those requirements by refusing to pass final legislation enabling nuclear cooperation until the agreements are in place and are satisfactory, the report noted.

The deal, allowing US-India nuclear cooperation for the first time in more than 30 years, would help create a stronger US-Indian relationship that would, in turn, improve America's position in Asia and the world. US policymakers of both parties have long been concerned about a rising China; by strengthening relations with China's next-door neighbour, the United States has the potential to improve its strategic position, it observed.

Meanwhile, as US policy increasingly focuses on promoting democracy worldwide, the appeal of a deeper relationship with the world's largest democracy is undeniable, it added. American exclusion of India from nuclear commerce has long grated on New Delhi, proving an irritant in the bilateral relationship, and removing this point of friction would no doubt strengthen the relationship, the report says.

While it criticises the administration for conceding too much in its negotiations with India, Levi and Ferguson conclude that, as long as Congress can reinforce a handful on non-proliferation bottom-lines, it would be unwise to scuttle the deal now.

The report calls for Congress and the administration to focus on five principles as the basic framework for solidifying the deal: -- Congress should ensure that, if India breaks its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, nuclear cooperation will cease.

-- To reinforce [India's] commitments [to strengthening export controls], Congress should ask the administration if it requires any money or legal authority to assist India in improving its export controls, and it should provide whatever is needed. This support would most likely fund American experts to work cooperatively with Indian authorities, rather than comprise direct transfers to India.

-- US legislation, while not mandating the future shape of the Indian nuclear complex, should provide incentives to steer India in the right direction.

-- Future cooperation should be freed from the formal annual review [that could] undermine the confidence-building purpose of the US-India deal. Instead, in exchange for giving up its annual right of review, Congress should provide less-intrusive incentives for India to label future reactors as civilian and place them under inspection.

-- Congress should accept that India will not unilaterally cap its nuclear arsenal.

While proponents of US-India engagement have opposed any delay for fear of undermining the deal, the report argue that an enduring strategic partnership cannot be founded only on rapport between a single pair of leaders and upon legislative action taken grudgingly.

Legislation passed with broad support will benefit both the United States and India in the long term.

UNI