Indo-US nuclear deal ends troubled relations with US: PM

New Delhi, Mar 7: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today informed the Lok Sabha that the Indo-US nuclear deal had ended years of ''troubled relations'' between the two nations and assured the House that the separation plan under the agreement would not cap or affect India's ''strategic programme'' or ''come in the way of the integrity of our three-stage nuclear programme.'' ''The separation plan will not adversely affect our strategic programme. There will be no capping of our strategic programme, and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic programme, based on our assessment of the threat scenario,'' Dr Singh said in a suo motu statement in the House.

Dr Singh further clarified that no constraint has been placed on ''our right'' to construct new facilities for strategic purposes. ''The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately protected,'' he said. Also, the separation plan for India's nuclear facilities (to place 65 per cent of such facilities under the civilian category and open them to international inspections) ''does not come in the way of the integrity of our three stage nuclear programme, including the future use of our thorium reserves.'' ''The autonomy of our research and development activities in the nuclear field will remain unaffected. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor remain outside safeguards.

''We have agreed, however, that future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian Fast Breeder Reactors would be placed under safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision,'' he said.

''Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by restraint and responsibility,'' Dr Singh said. Under the separation plan, India would identify and offer for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006-2014, the Prime Minister said. Of the 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction, 14 would be placed under safeguards by 2014 in a phased manner.

This would raise the total installed thermal power capacity in megawatts under safeguards from 19 per cent at present 65 per cent by 2014.

''I wish to emphasise that the choice of specific nuclear reactors and the phases in which they would be placed under safeguards is an Indian decision. We are preparing a list of 14 reactors that would be offered for safeguards between 2006-14,'' Dr Singh said.

India had conveyed that it would not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam.

The Fast Breeder Programme was at the R and D stage. This technology would take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development. ''We do not wish to place any encumbrances on our Fast Breeder programme, and this has been fully ensured in the Separation Plan.'' India had decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India ''retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian.

''This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements,'' he said.

India had decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor in 2010. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from France, and India was prepared to shift it from its present location and make it available for placing under safeguards in 2010, Dr Singh said. Both CIRUS and Apsara are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. ''We have decided to take these steps rather than fllow intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance. We are determined that such steps will not hinder ongoing research and development.'' Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for India's strategic programme ''have been kept out of the Separation Plan.'' One of the major points address in the plan was the need to ensure reliability of fuel supplies, given India's unfortunate past experience with regard to interruption in supply of fuel for Tarapur.

''We have received commitments from the United States for the reliable supply of fuel to India for reactors that will be offered for safeguards.'' The US had also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for such reactors.

Under the July 18 Joint Statement, the US ''is committed'' to seeking agreement from its Congress to amend domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international market for nuclear fuel, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

''This has been reflected in the formal understandings reached during the visit and included in the Separation Plan.''

To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for India, the US was prepared to take other additional steps, such as incorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would be negotiated. The US would join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

Washington would support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurred, the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include nations such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom, to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

In the light of these understandings with the US, an India-specific safeguards agreement would be negotiated between India and the IAEA.

In essence, an India-specific safeguards would provide on the one hand safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time, and on the other, permit India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.

Taking this into account, India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

In the terms of the Separation Plan, there was hence assurance of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under safeguards together with India's right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies were interrupted.

''The House can rest assured that India retains its sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to fully safeguard its interests,'' he said.

UNI